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DESDE LA AMERICA NUESTRA
By  Rafael Tarrago
CUBA AND CUBANS THROUGH THE PAGES OF
From Brave M
Most New York C ity newspapers sup­ported Cuban independence from the beginnings o f the insurrection in Feb­
ruary 1895, and the same was true of newspapers in the 
M idwest of the U .S. Cuban exile clubs and their Am er­
ican sympathizers in southern Florida and in the north­
east seaboard promoted public support for the cause of 
Cuban independence, and financed expeditions that 
brought food and am m unition to the Cuban Liberation 
Army.
The purpose o f this essay is to analyze U .S. opinion 
about the Cuban insurgents and events in Cuba as they 
were reported on the pages of The New York Times from 
October, 1897 to October, 1898; and to use the result­
ing chronology as a sounding board for questioning old 
verities concerning issues such as the position towards 
U .S. intervention in Cuba and the efficacy of the Teller 
Am endment to the U .S. Congress Jo int Resolution of 
April 18, 1898 in preventing the annexation of Cuba by 
the U .S.
Wreckage of U.S.S. Maine 
Photo by Charles E. Doty
en to Wards
THE NEW YORK TIMES IN 1898
1898, a New York paper; a day after
H om e R u le  in  C uba  vs. B rave  a n d  
D e sp e ra te  M en
T h e  home rule decree issued on November 28 by the 
Spanish Queen Regent was accepted as a reality by 
The New York Times, and as an honest attempt by 
the Madrid government to give Cuba everything in the way 
of local self-government.12 In “Cuban Autonomy,” pub­
lished on December 4, however, it warns, “It is in vain that
we may hold that any measure ought’ to pacify Cuba which 
does not in fact accomplish that result.” On December 15, 
this paper reported the surrender of the insurgent Cuban 
leader General Sanguily, and on the following day it pointed 
out the issuance by General Máximo Gómez, general-in- 
chief of the Cuban Liberation Army, of a proclamation stat­
ing that anyone approaching any company of the Liberation 
Army with peace proposals not based on the independence 
of Cuba would be executed. In January 28, 1898, General
Museo de la Historia, Habana, Cuba
Gómez proved true to his word, approving the execution of 
Colonel Joaquin Ruiz, a Cuban-born officer of the royal 
army sent as an emissary to him by Governor General 
Ramón Blanco to inform the insurgents of the program of 
home rule for Cuba.
On January 1, 1898, home rule and universal suffrage 
went into effect in Cuba, and The New York Times reported 
“Big Conspiracy in Cuba.” This article asserted that there 
had been demonstrations in the Cuban cities of Havana and 
Matanzas against the home rule government established only 
that day. It concluded with the report of crowds in Matan­
zas cheering for U.S. President William McKinley and the 
annexation of Cuba to the U.S. The same issue has an article 
titled “New Cuban Cabinet in Power,” where the Spanish 
Minister to the U.S. is quoted saying that with the new gov­
ernment, “there will be full realization of a Government of 
Cuba by the Cubans.” On January 2, the article, “Cuban 
Cabinet Sworn In,” describes the swearing-in ceremony of 
the provisional Cuban autonomous government at Havana.
Indeed, Cuban it was, because as part of his reconcilia­
tion policy, Governor General Blanco appointed only 
Cuban-born men, which angered many European-born 
Spaniards. In “The Riots in Havana,” on the editorial pages 
of January 15, The New York Times reports violent protests 
against the new regime at Havana on January 12. These dis­
turbances were controlled swiftly by Governor General Blan­
co, but The New York Times described them as a mark of the 
chronic crisis of Spain, and the failure of home rule in Cuba.
It is also said in this article that not a single insurgent 
had surrendered, implicitly denying events reported by this 
newspaper earlier concerning the surrender of some insur­
gents. This article concluded that the Cuban autonomous 
government was a farce into which Spanish rule in Cuba had 
degenerated, and that it was time to consider “the exigency 
of further action by the U.S. before the inhabitants of the 
wretched island had completed its devastation or their 
mutual extermination.” The autonomous government 
installed on January 2, 1898 was remarkably well-qualified.
It was not a group of planters, but a group of intellectuals, 
lawyers, and men of affairs, like Francisco Zayas, Laureano 
Rodriguez, Rafael Montoro, and José Maria Galvez; howev­
er, their high professional and human caliber would never be 
guessed from reading The New York Times.
T h e  C rises  o f  February : M en  in  a  S ta te  o f  O pen  
a n d  D e a d ly  H o s t i l i ty
On the front page of The New York Times for January 24 it was reported that several U.S. battleships were gath­
ering in Key West under Admiral Sicard. By that date the 
battleships New York, Indiana, Massachusetts, Iowa, and
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Texas had arrived off the bar; and the battleships Mont­
gomery, Detroit, and Maine joined them later. Claiming to 
be concerned about the ability of Governor General Blanco 
to control the riots of January 12, at Havana, U.S. Consul 
General Colonel Fitzhugh Lee wrote to Secretary of State 
Day on January 13, asking that 
U.S. battleships be sent to 
Havana to protect U.S. citizens.
Mr. Day obliged by having the 
U.S. Maine sent to Havana on 
January 24. Colonel Lee wrote 
to Mr. Day on February 4,
“Ship or ships should be kept 
here all the time now.”13 That is 
how the U.S. Maine arrived 
unannounced in Havana, where 
the embarrassed authorities 
made up a story about a courtesy visit to be reciprocated by 
the Spanish battleship Vizcaya in New York.
Colonel Lee had gone to Havana as Consul General 
sent by President Cleveland in April, 1896. In a letter of 
June 13, 1896 to Andres Gómez, Don Tomás Estrada
Palma, Delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New 
York City, talks of Colonel Lee as someone who will send 
reports to Washington that will promote the Cuban insur­
gent cause.14 From the moment of his arrival in Cuba, Lee 
was in touch with insurgent leaders, and carried messages for
them. He courted the insur­
gents and sent Washington neg­
ative reports about the possibili­
ties for successful Cuban home 
rule under the Spanish monar­
chy long before it was proposed 
by the Spanish government. It 
is not unjust to say that he went 
to Havana as a convinced 
annexationism. He said that 
most Cubans wanted annexation 
and he did his best to have this 
prophesy fulfilled. Although he curried favors for the insur­
gents—on February 15, 1898, he forwarded to President 
McKinley a letter from General Gomez—he always empha­
sized in his reports to Washington that all the Spaniards and 
the “better class” of Cubans wanted annexation.15 On Janu­
" H e  ( C o l .  L e e )  a l w a y s  
e m p h a s i z e d  i n  h i s  r e p o r t s  
t o  W a s h i n g t o n  t h a t  a l l  t h e  
S p a n i a r d s  a n d  t h e  " b e t t e r  
c l a s s "  o f  C u b a n s  w a n t e d  
a n n e x a t i o n . "
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Sigsbee had an American flag brought to the Maine, hoisted and then hauled 
down to half-mast.
ary 21, 1898, Colonel Lee sent a letter to 
Secretary of State Day with a devastating 
analysis of the autonomous constitution 
of Cuba which emphasized its flaws and 
did not take into account that it was a 
vast improvement over what the status of 
the island had been until then. It is pos­
sible that the source that gave those 
accounts of a failed Cuban autonomous 
government to The New York Times was 
the man who at that time was supposed 
to be the American best informed about 
Cuba, U.S. Consul General Colonel 
Fitzhugh Lee.
On February 8, 1898, the New York 
Journal published a private letter written 
by the Spanish minister to the U.S.,
Enrique Dupuy de Lome, to his friend 
Antonio Canalejas, in Havana. His letter 
almost caused a rupture of diplomatic 
relations between the U.S. and Spain. In 
it, Dupuy de Lome called President McKinley a low politi­
cian, and intimated that Spains Sagasta government had not 
been sincere in its relations with the Cuban autonomous 
government or the U.S. This affair made the front page of 
The New York Times on February 9. In “De Lome on the 
President,” it reproduced the contents of the letter, and told 
that it probably had been stolen from Mr. Canalejas by a 
Cuban agent while he was in Havana, and that the Delega­
tion of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New York had 
given it to the Journal. In the editorial pages of February 
15, the Journal endorsed the action of the Cuban insurgents, 
“Men in a state of open and deadly hostility.” The editors of 
The New York Times concluded this piece with the words, 
“War is a miserable work, and if stealing a letter or a thou­
sand will shorten it, the letters should be stolen.” Mr.
Dupuy de Lome resigned, and the Spanish government 
apologized for his behavior, assuring the U.S. government 
that it meant to implement the statutes of home rule grant­
ed to Cuba. Thus the publication of the Dupuy de Lome 
letter did not cause the crisis that the Cuban insurgents in 
the U.S. wanted.
But within a week a greater disaster occurred. On Feb­
ruary 15, the U.S.S. Maine blew up in Havana harbor. A 
crisis was prevented after the Dupuy de Lome letter affair, 
but the explosion of the Maine became a cause belli, even 
though it was never proven that a Spaniard had blown it up. 
On February 16, The New York Times had on its front page 
the article, “The Maine Blown Up,” where it reported the
terrible explosion, concluding that none of the wounded 
men were able to give an explanation. The following day 
the Maine was front-page news again. In “The Maine Dis­
aster,” The New York Times reported that the loss was due to 
an accident, that spontaneous combustion in coal bunkers 
was a frequent peril to the magazine of warships.
Could it be a coincidence that these two incidents hap­
pened so close to each other? The attempt by Cuban insur­
gents to provoke a conflict between the U.S. and Spain on 
February 8 failed. Could it be that the Cuban insurgents 
were behind the events of February 15? That was suggested 
in 1898, and General Máximo Gómez was quick to label the 
accusation “one more proof of Spanish perfidy.” Exactly one 
hundred years after the explosion of the U.S.S. Maine, the 
Spanish edition of The Miami Herald published an article by 
the Cuban journalist Carlos Alberto Montaner, where he 
asks “Who benefitted from the explosion of the Maine?” It 
is self-evident to him that it was the Cuban insurgents who 
wanted the U.S. to intervene as allies against the royal 
army. 7 The historian Guillermo G. Calleja has arrived at 
the same conclusion. His thesis (derived from the work of 
Jorge Navarro Custin) shows that the Cuban insurgents 
placed a mine on the Maine designed by the engineer Fed­
erico Blume, who had contacted the Cuban agent Aristides 
Agüero in Perú.18 Calleja points out that Captain Sigsbee of 
the U.S.S. Maine reported to have heard two explosions the 
night of the event. This supports the thesis of an external 
explosion which brought about a second one that blew up
11
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the magazine of the battleship. According to Calleja, the 
manuscript collection of Julio Lobo, Cuban magnate, con­
tained sworn statements by some of the Cuban insurgents 
who blew up the Maine.19
The first reaction to the explosion of the Maine by 
the U.S. authorities was that it had been an accident.
Then annexationists like Colonel Lee accused Spain of the 
deed. After a Spanish request for a joint investigation was 
declined, two investigating commissions were established: 
one conducted by the U.S. Navy, and the other by author­
ities in Havana. The Havana commission concluded that 
the explosion had been caused by internal combustion.
The U.S. Navy commission reported on March 21 that 
there were two explosions: the explosion of a mine 
beneath the hull that blew the keel upward, and the 
resulting detonation of the powder stored above. The 
Spanish government proposed to submit both reports to 
an arbitration commission, but the U.S. government 
refused. After the explosion of the U.S.S. Maine, the 
intervention of the U.S. in Cuba was assured.
T he U .S . R o ad  to  A rm ed  Intervention  in 
C u b a : “ B e g g ar s  S h o u ld  N o t  B e C h o o se r s”
In spite of the threat by generals Gomez and García, Cuban insurgents continued defecting. On March 15, 
The New York Times reported in the article, “Cubans Kill 
False Leaders,” that Cuban insurgent leaders Cayito,
Alvarez, and Nunez, had been killed by other insurgents 
while on their way to tender their submission to the 
Cuban autonomous government. But most insurgent gener­
als did not pact with the autonomous government after the 
explosion of the Maine. U.S. intent to intervene in Cuba 
was apparent after the U.S. Congress requested $50 million 
on March 9, for national defense. The insurgents were 
encouraged to assume that the Cuban Republic in Arms 
would be recognized and that the Cuban Liberation Army 
would be considered “belligerent” by the official declarations 
made by the U.S. government, and by the apparent support 
of their cause by the people of the U.S. On March 28, The 
New York Times reported, “It can be stated upon high 
authority that there has been no abatement of the Presidents 
intention to see that the war is terminated upon terms that 
will render the Cuban people practically free. It is not 
believed that they will accept anything less, nor that the 
Americans will be satisfied if we should encourage a settle­
ment that would not be acceptable to the Cubans.”
In The New York Times of April 6, 1898, a U.S. Senator 
is quoted saying, “No one will pretend to say that the status
John Bull: "it's rea lly  most ex traord ina ry w hat tra in ing w ill do. 
W h y  only the other day I though that man unable to 
support himself."
of the Republic of Cuba has ever approached anything like 
the condition of perfection of government that the southern 
Confederacy attained. It has no seaports, no U.S. consul...
It has not, as a matter of fact, controlled the island of 
Cuba.” This Senator concluded that if the U.S. was to 
intervene for the pacification of Cuba it should do so free­
handed. On April 7, the article “Junta Members Excited” 
quoted Mr. Rubens saying, “The action of the U.S., if it 
should declare that the Cubans are not in a position to be 
independent after having a week ago notified Spain that she 
must recognize the independence of the Cubans as a prereq­
uisite to any further negotiations would place the U.S. gov­
ernment in a peculiar light.” On this occasion, Mr. Rubens 
said that the government of the Cuban Republic, and the 
Cuban Liberation Army, would reject the intervention of the 
U.S. in Cuba unless it should be preceded by a recognition of 
its independence. But Don Tomás Estrada Palma, and his 

















Rubens’ statement. Afterwards Mr. Rubens explained him­
self. He said that his statement of the previous day meant 
that the Cuban Liberation Army would fight against U.S. 
annexation, but that as far as he was concerned, if Cubans 
opted for annexation once free from Spain, it was “all well 
and good.” On the same day Mr. Quesada reversed himself 
as well, now threatening that if the U.S. intervened without 
recognizing Cuba’s independence, it would be making a vir­
tual declaration of war against the insurgents as well as 
against Spain. But the 
author of the article,
“The Junta Members 
Excited,” well judged 
the situation, conclud­
ing that article with the 
words “beggars should 
not be choosers.”
On April 11, Presi­
dent McKinley 
addressed a message to 
Congress concluding 
that U.S. intervention 
in Cuba had become 
necessary, and asked 
for the authorization to 
take measures to end the war on the island, and on April 12, 
The New York Times reported that while opinions differed on 
this message as a whole, a majority of those questioned by 
the paper said that the people of Cuba ought to be free. On 
April 17, The New York Times reported that the previous 
night the U.S. Senate had concluded a three-day debate. A 
resolution was voted on jointly by the U.S. Congress on 
April 18, 1898 stating that the Cuban people ought to be. 
free and independent; that the U.S. and its government 
demanded the immediate renunciation by Spain of sover­
eignty over Cuba and the immediate evacuation of the Span­
ish government and its armed forces from the island; it gave 
the U.S. president authority to use armed force in order to 
implement the above; and it declared that the U.S. had no 
desire or intent of attaining sovereignty in Cuba, except for 
its pacification, and expressed the intent, once that goal had 
been achieved, to grant sovereignty and governance over 
Cuba to her people.20 On April 20, President McKinley 
signed this joint resolution, and sent an ultimatum to the 
Spanish government.
The last clause in the Joint Resolution of the U.S. Con­
gress was an amendment made through the offices of Sena­
tor Teller of Colorado. Cuban insurgents in the U.S. and in 
the island made a lot out of it, but it did not recognize the
Cuban Republic in Arms or the Cuban Liberation Army. As 
a matter of fact, this renunciation did not set any deadline 
for granting sovereignty over Cuba to her people. Horatio 
Rubens claimed later that Teller had proposed the amend­
ment at his urging.21 According to John L. Offner, the lob­
byist for the Cuban insurgents Janney and McCook received 
$2 million in 6 percent Cuban bonds for securing this dubi­
ous guarantee of Cuban independence.22 Hugh Thomas 
suggests that Teller was acting on behalf of Midwestern beet-
sugar interests concerned 
about competition from 
Cuban cane-sugar if Cuba 
became a U.S. territory and 
her products could enter the 
continental U.S. free of 
duty.23 The McKinley 
administration’s initial hos­
tility to the final form of the 
Joint Resolution gave way to 
approval as it realized that, 
because it did not recognize 
the Cuban Republic or the 
belligerency of the Cuban 
Liberation Army, the Teller 
Amendment did not commit 
the U.S. to grant Cuba independence in their time.24
T h e  U.S. a n d  t h e  C u b an  In s u rg e n ts :  O n e  R ace, 
H u m a n k in d ... O n ly  G o o d  N a tio n s  a n d  B ad
On May 6, The New York Times reported the opening of the Cuban Autonomous Parliament in Havana on 
May 5. This article describes the solemn oath taken by the 
deputies to defend the sovereignty of the Spanish crown in 
Cuba, the promise of further concessions to the Cubans 
made by Governor General Ramón Blanco, and the partici­
pation in these ceremonies by the hereto anti-home rule 
para-military corps known as Voluntarios. On May 8, The 
New York Times also reported the definite organization of the 
Cuban Chamber of Deputies, and five days later it reported 
in the article, “Cuban Congress at Work,” that the first 
political step taken by the Cuban Congress after it was con­
stituted had been to appoint a commission to send— 
through the Spanish government to European powers—a 
protest against the intervention of the U.S. in Cuban affairs. 
The Cuban Senate was also constituted and Mr. José Bruzón 
was elected as its president.
Reading The New York Times for 1898 one receives the 
impression that the Cuban insurgents welcomed U.S. inter­
“ I t  c a n  b e  s t a t e d  u p o n  h i g h  
a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  n o  
a b a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  
i n t e n t i o n  t o  s e e  t h a t  t h e  w a r  i s  
t e r m i n a t e d  u p o n  t e r m s  t h a t  w i l l  
r e n d e r  t h e  C u b a n  p e o p l e  
p r a c t i c a l l y  f r e e . ”
— T h e  N e w  Y ork  T im es, M a r c h  2 8 ,  1 8 9 8
vention in Cuba. Except for the demand that the U.S. rec­
ognize the Cuban Republic in Arms before it intervened 
made by Mr. Rubens in New York, all the Cuban leaders 
accepted U.S. intervention unconditionally. As a matter of 
fact, General Máximo Gómez had sent a letter to President 
McKinley on February 9, 1897, asking him to employ the 
weight of his authority to stop Spain.25 He had a similar let­
ter forwarded to McKinley by Consul Lee on February 15, 
1898/ In the past half century it has become common 
opinion that the Cuban insurgents were winning in their 
struggle against the royalist 
forces and loyalist Cubans, but 
reading the war diaries of Gen­
eral Máximo Gómez one gets a 
different impression. General 
Máximo Gómez admits his des­
perate situation on February 28, 
to the pages of his diary—after 
the desertion of seventeen men, 
his force had been reduced to 
thirty men. On March 1, his 
force was taken by surprise and 
barely escaped capture.27
Proponents of the theory 
that a conquering Cuban Army of Liberation was cheated of 
victory by U.S. intervention will admit that a few insurgents 
were in favor of intervention, but only among those in exile, 
and some will add that those were former Autonomists. It is 
true that the propaganda activities of the New York delega­
tion of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (the New York Junta) 
helped precipitate a war between the U.S. and Spain.28 Hor­
atio Rubens was scolded by the Cubans at the headquarters 
of the Junta in New York after he declared to The New York 
Times that the Cuban insurgents would oppose armed inter­
vention by the U.S. in Cuba unless it recognized the inde­
pendence of the Cuban Republic.29 But it was not only 
Cubans in the U.S. who wanted the U.S. to intervene in 
Cuba. Insurgent Cubans on the island did too, and they 
had their reasons. General Gómez was not winning battles 
or holding towns on May 2, 1898, when he sent a message 
asking for assistance to General Sampson through the offices 
of the U.S. vice-consul in Sagua; and on May 17, he was 
unable to take the town of Jicotea after it was abandoned by 
government troops, because he was out of ammunition and 
waiting to receive some from “the chief of the allied army. 30 
On May 21, he wrote in his diary: “if reinforcements from 
Oriente do not arrive, it is doubtful the campaign will be 
successful here. 31
Bartolomé Masó and the government of the Cuban
Republic in Arms supported the intervention unconditional­
ly as early as April 28, 1898.32 On May 1, 1898, General 
Garcia received a delegation from the U.S. Army, one of 
whose members carried a telegram from Don Tomás Estrada 
Palma, the Delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in 
New York, and because of that telegram, and because he 
consulted the Cuban civil government, it has been argued 
that General Garcia cooperated with the U.S. armed forces 
following orders of the government of the Cuban Republic 
in Arms.33 But before the Americans went to him with the
telegram of introduction from 
Don Tomás Estrada Palma, 
General Garcia had expressed 
his desire to cooperate uncon­
ditionally with them in a note 
dated April 18, 1898.34 This 
decision may have been moti­
vated by General Garcias per­
ception of the Cuban 
autonomous government as far 
superior to that of the Cuban 
Republic in Arms as a civil 
working government, and 
therefore more likely to be 
courted by the Americans once the latter had forced the 
Spanish crown to cede its sovereignty over Cuba.35
In a letter of May 1, 1898, to vice-president Méndez 
Capote, General Garcia announced his taking Bayamo, and 
claimed that other cities in Oriente were going to fall soon, 
but he did not answer desperate calls for help from General 
Gómez three weeks later, on May 21.36 In a letter dated 
June 12, to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, General Samp­
son refers to a letter from General Garcia to the American 
General Miles assuring that officer that he regarded his wish­
es and suggestions as orders.
It seems that Enrique Collazo made a fair assessment of 
the conduct in 1898 of the New York Delegation, the civil 
government of the Cuban Republic in Arms, and of the two 
major leaders of the Cuban Liberation Army. He wrote in 
1905 that “delivered to the U.S. by the civil government and 
the Delegation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party abroad, 
Cubans did not expect liberty to come from their army but 
from the whim or will of the President of the U.S.”37 In his 
work, Los Americanos en Cuba, General Collazo criticizes the 
civil government of the Cuban Republic in Arms and the 
commanders-in-chief of the Cuban Liberation Army for not 
negotiating with the Spanish authorities in Cuba and the 
Cuban autonomous government after the unilateral Spanish 
cease fire of April 11. Instead they gave their unconditional
“ R e a d i n g  T h e  N e w  Y o r k  
T i m e s  f o r  1 8 9 8  o n e  
r e c e i v e s  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  
t h a t  t h e  C u b a n  i n s u r g e n t s  
w e l c o m e d  U . S .  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  C u b a . ”
“Cubans did not expect 
liberty to come from their 
army but from the whim 
or will of the 
President of the U.S.”
-Gen. Collazo
support to the U.S. government that refused to acknowledge 
them.38 But they had reasons to suspect the good faith of 
what they saw as reforms made in desperation since the 
Abarzuza’s reforms, accepted unanimously by the Cortes in 
February 1895, had never been implemented—although I 
will dare say that Gomez’ desire to avenge his son and Gar­
cias pique were the main reasons for their unwillingness to 
deal with Spain in a way that allowed her to save face. Like­
wise, the exiles had decided that anything was preferable to 
dealing with Spain. General Blanco had success obtaining 
the surrender of some insurgent officers, but without the 
surrender of either Garcia or Gómez, peace was impossible 
in the short term. In his campaign diary Máximo 
Gómez records at least three attempts by Governor 
General Blanco to win him over. Unrecorded in 
Gomez’s diary is a letter from General Blanco dated 
April 22, which Horatio Rubens translated together 
with Gomez’s answer in his memoir of Cuba, The 
Story o f  Freedom (1937).39
In his letter of April 22, 1898 to Máximo 
Gómez, Governor General Blanco warned that Ameri­
cans were of a different ethnic origin and wanted to 
exterminate Cubans because of their Spanish blood 
with their blockade of the island; which acts were 
damaging to both Cubans and Spaniards and would 
finish the human destruction that mutual depreda­
tions during the war of independence had begun. He 
proposed an alliance of both armies at Santa Clara, 
where the Cuban insurgents would receive arms from 
the royal army to fight the Americans, suggesting that 
once the war was over, Spain would welcome Cuba as 
a new Spanish-speaking nation of the same religion 
and blood. General Máximo Gómez answered, indig­
nant, that Cubans and Spaniards could never live in 
peace together on Cuban soil, and that he knew of 
only one race, humankind; that for him there were 
only good nations and bad, and up till then he had 
reasons for admiring the U.S. He concluded saying, “I
have written President McKinley and General Miles thank­
ing them for the American intervention in Cuba.”
T he U.S. in  C u b a : C uba ’s Independence... 
F r o m  S pain
It seems puzzling that a war to liberate Cubans from Span­ish oppression began in the Philippines, but the destruc­
tion of the Spanish fleet at Cavite on May 1, 1898, was the 
first engagement in this war between the U.S. and Spain. 
Like in Cuba, there was an independence movement in the 
Philippines, and on April 24, 1898, the Filipino leader, 
Emilio Aguinaldo, had conversations with the U.S. consul in 
Singapore. On May 19, Aguinaldo joined Commodore 
Dewey, commander of the U.S. fleet in Manila Bay. He 
established his headquarters at Cavite, assumed dictatorial 
powers, and began operations against the armed forces of the 
Spanish government.40 It is likely that Aguinaldo was given 
verbal statements of support for the independence of the 
Philippines by the U.S. consul in Singapore, E. Spencer 
Pratt, and by Commodore Dewey.41 On June 12, Aguinaldo 
declared the independence of the Philippines, and on June
The noble hero (to the heavy villa in): "Stand b a c k  there, go t darn  
ye! If  you force this thing to a fifth act, remember that's where I 
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23, he decreed the establishment of a provisional govern­
ment with himself as president. Unlike General Garcia in 
Cuba, he made no offer to place himself under American 
orders.42
When war broke out in April 1898, the immediate 
action of the U.S. naval squadrons stationed at Key West 
since February was to blockade Cuban harbors. On the 
front page of The New York 
Times on May 7, the capture on 
the previous evening of the 
French steamer Lafayette, off 
Havana harbor while trying to 
run this blockade, was reported.
The U.S. did not begin 
military operations in Cuba, 
however, until June, 1898, a 
month after it began them in 
Asia. On June 2, General Miles 
sent a message from Tampa to 
General Calixto García, second-in-command of the Cuban 
army, in charge of forces in eastern Cuba, and within a week 
the Cuban insurgent general replied from his base near 
Bayamo that his forces would actively assist the landing of 
the U.S. Army, and that he regarded Miles’ “wishes and sug­
gestions as orders.” No formal agreement had been pro­
posed or effected between Miles and Garcia, but the latter’s 
response implied that he was voluntarily placing himself and 
his troops under American direction and control.43 A land­
ing of U.S. marines occurred at Guantánamo Bay. However, 
a massive landing of 17,000 troops did not occur until June 
22 at Daikiri, following a meeting between Garcia and U.S. 
Army Commander General William R. Shafter. This U.S. 
expeditionary force had the assistance of the Cuban Libera­
tion Army, who had also carried out a diversionary feint at 
Cabañas. In addition, the mere presence of local insurgent 
forces acted as a constraint upon the movement of royalist 
troops throughout the military division of Santiago de 
Cuba.44
The Cuban Liberation Army made important contribu­
tions to the Santiago campaign, but U.S. troops soon devel­
oped an attitude of contempt for their nominal allies. In his 
war account, The Rough Riders (1899), Colonel Theodore 
Roosevelt says, “There was a Cuban guide at the head of the 
column, but he ran away as soon as the fighting began; two 
American reporters where there, two men, who did not run 
away.”45 This dismissal of Cubans as cowardly is one of 
many negative comments about the courage and fighting 
caliber of the insurgents as reflected in Theodore Roosevelt’s 
memoirs. In his account of fighting at El Caney, Roosevelt
describes Cubans, “scattering like guinea pigs. 46 Roosevelt 
was particularly unimpressed by the appearance of the 
Cuban Liberation Army at the moment he landed in Cuba, 
when, he says, “At Daikiri we found hundreds of Cuban 
insurgents, a crew as utter tatterdemalions as human eyes 
ever looked on, armed with every kind of rifle in all stages of 
dilapidation. It was evident at a glance, that they would be
no use in serious fighting, but it 
was hoped that they might be 
of service in scouting. From a 
variety of causes, however, they 
turned out to be nearly useless, 
even for this purpose, so far as 
the Santiago campaign was con­
cerned." 47 Ironically, Colonel 
Roosevelt praises the “Spanish 
guerrillas,” unaware that this 
force in the royal army in Cuba 
was overwhelmingly Cuban-born."
On July 4, the small Spanish fleet, which had been 
trapped inside Santiago’s bottle-necked harbor, attempted to 
escape, and was sunk in the effort. The city of Santiago 
would not capitulate unconditionally though, and negotia­
tions began between the Spanish commander of the city,
Jose Toral, and U.S. Army commander General Shafter. The 
latter feared that investing Santiago would be very costly in 
human lives, and also that a long siege would allow the 
spread of tropical diseases among his unacclimated men.49 
On July 14, General Toral formally surrendered the troops 
of his army in the city as well as all government troops and 
divisions in the eastern province of Cuba. The U.S. made 
the commitment to repatriate all the soldiers from Spain 
who would want to return.50 The terms of surrender stipu­
lated that incumbent civil officers and local constabulary 
authorities were to be ratified in their positions, and that all 
residents of the province passed directly under the authority 
and protection of the U.S.51
In the article “Santiago and After,” The New York Times 
on July 17, 1898, encouraged the conquest of Puerto Rico 
because “no better time would be chosen for that capture 
than the moment at which the Spanish Minister of War is 
talking of the retention of that island as an indispensable 
condition of peace.” It concluded that “the intolerable nui­
sance which the war was undertaken to abate cannot be per­
petuated in Puerto Rico,” and that “Spanish rule must be 
banished completely and unconditionally from our hemi-
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sphere.” These words echo what Theodore Roosevelt said 
later in The Rough Riders: “I preached with all the fervor and 
zeal I possessed, our duty to intervene in Cuba, and to take 
this opportunity of driving the Spanish from the Western 
World. 52 But in Santiago de Cuba the U.S. regulars frater­
nized with their erstwhile enemies, the Spaniards. Officers 
and privates in the U.S. Army and Navy could be seen in 
the city together with Spaniards of their own rank. A lieu­
tenant in the U.S. Army later reminisced, “I met many of 
the Spanish officers in the restaurants of the city, and I must 
admit that they were, as a rule, capital fellows, kindly dis­
posed, hospitable, and very gentlemanly. 53 The Spaniards 
reciprocated the feelings of the Americans for them. Before 
departing for Europe, the Spanish private, Pedro Lopez de 
Castillo, wrote a letter of appreciation to the American 
Army which was signed by 11,000 Spanish soldiers. The 
Spanish soldiers wished the Americans “all happiness and 
health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear 
Spain, but will be yours, who have conquered it by force and 
watered it with your blood;” and concluded, “these people 
are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will
find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civi­
lized communities. 54
General Shafter excluded General Garcia from the peace 
negotiations, and the insurgent army from capitulation cere­
monies. On July 14, Garcia learned that his forces would 
neither share in the municipal administration of Santiago 
nor receive control of Cuban territory. He demanded from 
Shafter a clarification of the status of Santiago and learned 
that the Cuban Liberation Army would not be permitted 
into the city. He refused the personal invitation to attend 
the capitulation ceremonies at Santiago extended to him by 
Shafter, and after breaking publicly with the Americans, he 
forwarded to General Máximo Gómez a formal protest of 
American actions accompanied by his resignation.55 General 
Shafter answered General Garcias protest, and reminded 
him that the war was between the U.S. and Spain.56 On 
July 26, The New York Times reported in the article “The 
Cuban Complaints” the circumstances surrounding the dif­
ferences between General Garcia and General Shafter at San­
tiago. This article concludes with the words, “in our view 
there is at present no government of Cuba, but there is a 
municipal government of Santiago de Cuba,” and “to keep
T i m e l i n e s  o f  t h e  S p a n i s h -
1868
September 23
Manuel Rojas organized Separatist Party, 
pledged to create independent Republic 
of Puerto Rico as part of uprising known 
as Grito de Lares. His plantation in town 
of Lares became headquarters for like- 
minded revolutionaries who would push 
for split from Spain.
October 10
Carlos M. Céspedes issued Grito de Yara 
initiating Ten Years' War in Cuba, the 
independence movement that served as 
forerunner of 1895 Insurrection and 
Spanish-Cuban War.
1833
M arch  22
Spain abolished slavery in Puerto Rico.
Charles D. Sigsbee
1892
Jan u ary  5  
José Marti formed El Partido Revolu­
cionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary 
Party) organized first in New York and 




Cuban independence movement (Ejército 
Libertador de Cuba) issued Grito de 
Baire, declaring Independencia o Muerte 
(Independence or Death), as revolution­
ary movement in Cuba began. Quelled 
by Spanish authorities same day.
A pril 10
José Marti and Máximo Gómez Báez 
returned to Cuba to fight for indepen­
dence; Gómez to serve as military leader 
of new revolution. Cuban Revolutionary
Ramón Blanco
Party-New York worked tirelessly for rev­
olution, inspired by José Marti, main­
tained by various voices for Revolution.
1897
Spain bowed to U.S. pressure to improve 
relations with colonies: agreed to 
autonomous constitution for Puerto Rico.
1898
Jan u ary  1
Spain grants limited autonomy to Cuba.
February 15
U.S.S. Maine explodes in Havana Har­
bor.
A pril 19
U.S. Congress by vote of 3 11 to 6 in the 
House and 42 to 35 in the Senate adopt­
ed Joint Resolution for war with Spain. It
Máximo Gómez
Cuban troops out was a necessity,” because “when our men 
are compelled to shell our allies in order to induce them to 
desist from killing prisoners, we have had sufficient notice of 
what would be the result of letting them lose upon a captive 
town. 57 In the same issue the article, “The Future of Cuba,” 
ponders the intention as declared in the Joint Resolution of 
Congress to leave the government and control of the island 
to its people, but that it might be that Cubans wished to 
exercise their right of control to become U.S. citizens.
Hostilities between the U.S. and Spain ended formally 
on August 12—although the capture of Manila by U.S. 
forces was staged on August 13. Since the Cuban insurgents 
were not signatories to the peace protocol, insurgent armies 
continued operations, and the U.S. appealed to the Delega­
tion of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New York to call 
them to order. Don Tomás Estrada Palma, the Delegate, 
accepted the peace protocol, and his decision was subse­
quently accepted by the civil government of the Cuban 
Republic in Arms.58 Talk of renewing the war against the 
U.S. went on among the Cuban insurgent armed bands, but 
they had neither weapons nor supplies, nor the monies to 
purchase them, because those came to the insurgents
through the Cuban Revolutionary Party juntas in the U.S.59 
On August 13, General García was dismissed by the civil 
government of the Cuban Republic in Arms for establishing 
a military dictatorship in eastern Cuba, and in early Septem­
ber it authorized the disbandment of the entire eastern army. 
In late September, the civil government called for a National 
Assembly to meet at Santa Cruz del Sur, and on October 23, 
it formally dissolved itself and invested the Santa Cruz del 
Sur Assembly as the provisional supreme authority of the 
Republic of Cuba.60
General H. L. Lawton replaced General Shafter as 
provincial governor in eastern Cuba, and upon his arrival in 
Cuba, he had a conference with General García, where he 
convinced the Cubans that the U.S. intended to honor the 
terms of the Joint Resolution, but that Cuban cooperation 
was essential to the success of the congressional pledge. By 
September 27, García was giving his support to the Ameri­
cans because he despised the Santa Cruz Assembly more.
His denunciation of the provisional government and his 
endorsement of U.S. authorities in Cuba served to legitimize 
the refusal by the latter to recognize the authority of the 
Santa Cruz Assembly.61 On October 1, 1898, The New York
Cuban-Am erican War
included the Teller Amendment (dis­
c la im ed any intention b y  U.S. to exercise 
ju risdiction o r control over Cuba except 
in a pacification role, prom ised to leave 
the island as soon as w a r was over.
April 25
W ar form ally  declared between Spain 
a nd  U.S.
June, 10
U.S. M arines land a t Guantánamo, 
Cuba.
July 3
Spanish fleet attempts to leave Santiago  
Bay. A ll ships destroyed, 3 5 0  left dead,
16 0  wounded.
Jul y  2 8
Duque de A lm odovar de l Rio called for 
U.S. annexation o f  Cuba.
 Nelson A . M iles
Miles issued pub lic  proclam ation in 
Ponce
stating purpose o f  U.S. invasion was to 
bring  Puerto Rico a  "banner o f  free­
dom ."
N ovem ber 10
U.S. does not recognize the Cuban 
G ov./Assem bly o f  Representatives o f  the 
Revolution, which included M a jo r Gener­
a l Calixto García. U.S. instead stated it 
had declared w a r on Spain and  a ll o f  its 
possessions because o f destruction o f  
battleship U.S.S. M aine and  other acts 
against U.S.
December 10
Treaty o f  Paris signed. Spain renounced 
a ll rights to Cuba, a llow ed an indepen­
dent Cuba, ceded Puerto Rico and  Guam
Tomas Estrada Palma
to U.S. gave up possessions in West 




Spanish forces left Cuba.
1900 
April 12
U.S. Congress passed the Foraker Act, 
establishing civ ilian government in P.R. 
under U.S. control, p rov ided fo r elected 
House o f  Representatives on island, but 
not fo r vote in Washington.
May 1
W ith inauguration o f  Gov. Charles H. 
Allen, the U.S. c iv ilian government o f  
Puerto Rico begins.
W illiam  Day
On August 13, General García was dismissed by the civil government of the Cuban 
Republic in Arms for establishing a military dictatorship in eastern Cuba.
Times reported that while former U.S.
Consul General at Havana Fitzhugh 
Lee avowed that Cuba would secure its 
independence and be fitted for it under 
a “not long guardianship...,” this 
seemed somewhat premature confi­
dence.
In the article “An Envoy in Dis­
guise” on October 9, The New York 
Times chastised Cuban supporters of 
the Cuban autonomous government, 
because Mr. Rivero, editor of the senior 
Havana daily El diario de la Marina, 
was in New York seeking a rapproche­
ment between Cuban supporters of 
home rule under the Spanish crown 
and Cuban exiles in New York who 
supported Cuban independence. The 
New York Times wondered how much 
credence the Cubans in New York 
would give to “the myth that the 
Autonomists are anything else than a 
group of Spaniards who for years have 
been the worst of foes to the real patri­
ots of the island.” This article con­
cludes that the pretense of an autonomous Cuban govern­
ment had been revived for the plain purpose of embarrassing 
the pending negotiations between the U.S. and Spain, and 
that the disguised royalists were posing as the representatives 
of a phase of Cuban sentiment.
The fact is that, despite the predictions of The New York 
Times since October 1897, the Cuban autonomous govern­
ment continued functioning after the war of the U.S. with 
Spain began. On June 22 (p. 1: 5), in the article “Galvez 
Hopes for Spain,” The New York Times reported an address 
of the Cuban Prime Minister, where he said that he would 
rather see heavens fall than an invasion of Cuba by a foreign 
army. At the Cuban Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Galvez had 
repeatedly said that home rule was not a regime to benefit 
the Cuban-born Creole, nor the European-born only, but 
for all the inhabitants of the island of Cuba. It is puzzling 
that one of the better informed newspapers in the U.S. did 
not know that the Cuban autonomous government contin­
ued operating outside of eastern Cuba after the capitulation 
of Santiago in July, and of the cessation of hostilities 
between Spain and the U.S. in August. It existed until the 
end of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba on December 31,
1898.62 Whatever individual former Autonomists may have 
said or done after 1898, the fact is that the Cuban Liberal
(home rule) Party was the only Cuban political group 
opposed to U.S. intervention in Cuba in that fateful 
year.
By November 1898, the U.S. authorities in Cuba 
had become arbiters of contending factions among the 
Cuban insurgents. In that month the Santa Cruz 
Assembly sent a commission to Washington D.C., and 
General Garcia also traveled to the U.S. in order to 
present a case for its dissolution. On December 29, 
General Gómez broke what had been a long silence to 
address the remains of the Cuban Liberation Army, 
appealing for reconciliation and unity. Calixto García 
had died that month in the U.S., and Don Tomás 
Estrada Palma suggested to the U.S. authorities to give 
Gómez some official attention. In January of 1899 
President McKinley sent a special representative to 
General Máximo Gómez, who accepted to cooperate 
in disbanding the Cuban Liberation Army, and dis­
tributing $3 million to the insurgent soldiers.63 Soon 
after, the Santa Cruz Assembly denounced Gomez’s 
actions, and threatened to deprive him of the moral 
authority necessary to implement the dissolution of 
the Liberation Army. But the U.S. Military Governor 
of Cuba, Brooke, dissolved the Assembly by decree,














Reenactment of the signing of the peace protocol, August 12, 1898
and General Gómez, acting under the authority of the U.S. 
government, disbanded the Cuban Liberation Army.64 
These events clarified that U.S. intervention in the Cuban 
war of independence evolved into a Spanish- American 
War.65
C o n c lu s io n s
Cuban historian Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring debunked the myth that Cubans received independence from the 
U.S. in his monograph Cuba no debe su independencia a los 
Estados Unidos (1950), but in this work he devised his own 
myth of a Cuban Liberation Army on the road to victory.66 
He was instrumental in bringing about an official proclama­
tion of the Cuban Academy of History designating the War 
of the U.S. with Spain a “Spanish-Cuban-American War,” a 
concept that, in my opinion, ignores the fact that the U.S. 
government never granted belligerent status to the Cuban 
Liberation Army, that the U.S. armed forces marginalized 
the Cuban army as soon as they were established in Cuba 
(never treating the Cuban insurgents as allies), and that, for 
all practical purposes, the intervention of the U.S. in Cuba 
in 1898 was part of a war of the U.S. with Spain which 
t began at Manila Bay in April 1898. Furthermore, if the
Cuban Liberation Army was on its road to victory in early
1898, why did its General-in-Chief, Máximo Gómez, 
request assistance from the President of the U.S. through the 
offices of U.S. Consul General Fitzhugh Lee on February 15? 
Victorious generals do not request assistance unconditionally. 
The way things seem to have actually been is best described 
by General Shafter’s answer to General Garcias protest.
Shafter said, “This war, as you 
well know, is between the U.S.j?
and Spain alone. 67
It is likely that without 
U.S. armed intervention in
1898 home rule would have 
become established in Cuba, 
and eventually Cuba would 
have become independent 
peacefully. But instead of a 
peace between Cubans, a 
peace treaty between the U.S. 
and Spain was signed in Paris 
on December 10, 1898.68 
One may dare say that the 
unconditional cooperation 
that generals Gomez and Gar­
cia gave to the U.S. interven­
tion in Cuba is a classic case of decision making flawed by 
personal motives, and Cuban historiography since Roig de 
Leuchsenring has been flawed by the awful consequences 
that come from lying to oneself, by refusing to acknowledge 
the actions of the patriot generals candidly, without lessen­
ing the grave consequences of what was at least a serious 
tactical error.
From October 1897 to October 1898, the opinions 
expressed in the editorials and in the reporting of The New 
York Times about Cuba and the Cubans changed consider­
ably. In 1897 this newspaper applauded the reluctance of 
the Cuban insurgents to accept anything less than indepen­
dence from Spain. Throughout the year 1898 the negative 
opinion that The New York Times held of Spain did not 
change, and its editorials on the Cuban autonomous govern­
ment were consistently pessimistic. Also consistent through­
out the period covered in this essay, the sources of The New 
York Times in Cuba would report that the “best people” in 
the island favored its annexation to the U.S. But in the lat­
ter part of 1898, there was a considerable change in opin­
ions about Cubans and Cuban independence. By April, 
Cuban insurgents demanding a commitment to Cuban 
independence from the U.S.—as it threatened intervention 
in Cuba—were reminded by The New York Times that beg­
gars should not be choosers. On July 26, this newspaper 
expressed doubts about the capability of Cubans for self-gov­
ernment, and suggested that Cubans might want to become 
U.S. citizens. Under Spain it encouraged the Cuban insur­
gents to intransigence—as brave men—but under the U.S. 
it encouraged them to acquiesce, to become wards. ■
Turn to page 40 for the footnotes to this article.
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